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The California Roadway---
"A More Necessary Public Use"
By NoRMAN E. MATTEONI*
EMINENT domain is usually considered to be the power to take
private property for a public purpose.' Yet that power has also been
employed to take property that is already devoted to a public use.
2
The California Legislature has enacted several statutes defining, by
law, priorities of public use.3 It has also enacted Code of Civil Pro-
cedure sections 1240 (3) and 1241 (3), which provide for the acquisition
of land already devoted to a public use whenever the subsequent
public use is a "more necessary" one. It is the purpose of this article
to suggest guidelines to aid the courts in weighing the issue of greater
necessity as raised by sections 1240(3) and 1241(3) by focusing upon
the general legal apparatus that allows one public user to supersede
another.
While property already devoted to a public use may be acquired
under sections 1240 (3) and 1241 (3) for any number of subsequent more
necessary uses, it is the convergence of streets, expressways and high-
ways in urban centers that produces the greatest possibility of colli-
ison with a pre-existing use. In fact, the designers of streets and
highways have not always attempted to avoid the conflict. However,
sometimes because of legislative restraint and other times because of
inter-governmental relations or the balance of power (certainly it is
easier to overcome the resistance of a private property owner than
that of a public user) this conflict is avoided. For example, the
California Highway Commission, in a pamphlet that it distributes
regarding freeway route hearings, warns: "Schools, public buildings,
hospitals, churches, cemeteries and parks are difficult to replace in
favorable locations. They are important controls governing the loca-
tion of a new freeway and wherever possible these establishments are
* Deputy County Counsel of Santa Clara County; Member of California
Bar.
1 CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 14. "Eminent Domain is the right of the people
or government to take private property for public use .... " CAL. CODE Civ.
PRoc. § 1237.
2 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 221, 226, 43 P. 602,
603 (1896); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.
8 See text accompanying notes 19-46 infra.
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not disturbed.4
San Francisco's Mayor, Joseph L. Alioto, has mocked such warn-
ings of the Commission, labeling its members "piratical raiders"5 who
arbitrarily lay their ribbons of concrete through parks, schools and
public opinion. The city's chronicler, Herb Caen, is no less critical:
"As for the highway engineers, their problem is simply to build a
straight line between two points at the lowest possible cost (in mil-
lions) and if something like Golden Gate Park gets in the way, too bad
for Golden Gate Park. In the hierarchy of anarchy, the car is god and
a place to park is heaven."6
However, while San Francisco publicly manifests a negative
attitude toward unaesthetic concrete channels of traffic,7 it is clear
that the State's major centers of population, including San Francisco,
are heavily dependent upon the highway for transportation and flow
of commerce. For example, the Los Angeles metropolitan area is an
1,800 square-mile web of 89 cities lashed together by the threads of a
complicated freeway pattern.8 Furthermore, statewide statistics show
that Californians drive more than 11% million motor vehicles over
171,000 lineal miles of roadways. 9 For these reasons, the California
roadway offers the best means of examining the general question of
"more necessary public use," and the scope of this article is aimed,
therefore, at a consideration of the problems related to this particular
context.
A. Introduction
Before considering the narrow question of how a court in Califor-
nia should handle the issue of "more necessary public use," it is appro-
priate to examine the general judicial and legislative dogmas that
historically have surrounded the pre-emption of one public user by
another. Basically, these are two: (1) the judicial doctrine of prior
4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, DIVSION OF
HIGHWAYS, FREEWAY FACTS 6 (1964).
5 San Francisco Chronicle, July 26, 1968, at 1, col. 2. The newspaper
article indicated the Mayor acknowledged that the phrase was borrowed
from a New York Times editorial writer.
6 H. CAEN & D. KNGmAN, SAN FRAucIsco-CTY oN GOLDEN HILLS 62
(1967).
7 In addition to the above quotes from the first and fourth estates-the
government and the press-a few years ago the City of San Francisco stopped
the Embarcadero Freeway in mid-span across its water front. Further, in 1968,
pressure was exerted to make the State choose a ridge route for its Junipero
Serra Freeway instead of a path through San Francisco's Crystal Springs area
of watershed and future recreation.
8 N. MORGAN, THE PACIFIC STATES 28 (1967).
9 COUNTY SUpVIsOws Ass'N OF CAL., 1968 CAIFoRNIA COUNTY FACT
BOOK 85, 87.
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public use; and (2) the legislative mandates of specific statutory prior-
ities.
The Doctrine of Prior Public Use
The condemnation of the lands of one public user by another
may be thwarted initially by the doctrine of "prior public use," a
limitation developed by the judiciary to prevent arbitrary or retalia-
tory acquisitions by authorized condemning agencies against one an-
other. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained this rule simply as
a denial of the right of condemnation "where the proposed use will
destroy an existing public use or prevent a proposed public use unless
authority to do so has been expressly given by the Legislature or must
necessarily be implied."'1
Actually, this doctrine is a corollary of the principle that requires
strict construction of statutory grants of eminent domain authority.
As the California Supreme Court has stated: The right to take prop-
erty must be exercised according to "the will of the sovereign as
expressed by the legislature, and such right can be exercised only in
behalf of those public uses that the legislature has authorized, and in
the mode and with the limitations prescribed in the statute which
confers the authority."'" As early as 1863, California had adopted
the doctrine of "prior public use," when Justice E. B. Crocker held
that one railroad company could not locate its line over the previously
located line of another company, except at crossings and intersec-
tions.12
In another railroad case, Commissioner' 3 Niles Sears of the 1896
California Supreme Court borrowed reasoning from a New York de-
cision 14 to explain the rationale of the doctrine: Although the power
of eminent domain is one of the inalienable incidents of sovereignty,
it must be exercised by virtue of the legislative will. For, if the
power were uncontrolled, one corporation having the right of con-
demnation would be able to take the land of a similar corporation;
whereupon the second corporation having the same power could then
re-condemn the land for its own use. This absurd process of retalia-
tion was never intended by the law-making power.' 5
30 Weehawken v. Erie R.R., 20 N.J. 572, 579, 120 A.2d 593, 596 (1956).
11 Lindsay Irr. Co. v. Mehrtens, 97 Cal. 676, 678, 32 P. 802 (1893).
12 Contra Costa R.R. v. Moss, 23 Cal. 323, 330 (1863).
'3 From 1885 until 1904 vwhen the District Courts of Appeal were estab-
lished, the California Supreme Court had the power to appoint three persons
as commissioners "to aid and assist the Court in the performance of its duties,
and in [disposition of the] numerous causes now pending in said Court unde-
termined." Act of March 12, 1885, ch. 120, § 1, 1885 Cal. Stats. 101.
14 In re New York, 99 N.Y. 12, 23, 1 N.E. 27, 32 (1885).
15 Southern Pac. Ry. v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 221, 228, 43 P. 602, 604
(1896).
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The courts, however, have carved out an exception to this rule of
restriction where it is shown that "the proposed use will serve a
greater public interest than the existing use."'16 Unfortunately, the
courts of some states have declined to fix definite priorities in this
situation to help determine when a public use can qualify as a "more
necessary," or greater use. To the Indiana Supreme Court "the deter-
mination of the relative values and importance of different public
uses, one of which will be inconsistent with or destroy the other is
purely a legislative matter-one of policy to be determined in the
legislative halls and not in the court room."'71
While not all legislatures have acted to delineate those situations
in which one public use, by statute, is of greater public interest than
another, the California Legislature has not hesitated to establish many
statutory priorities, as well as some restrictions. Since a statute of
specific authorization controls a general provision, 8 it will be helpful
to review some of these specific legislative priorities, especially those
dealing with the California roadway, before turning to the general
provisions of sections 1240 (3) and 1241 (3).
Specific Legislative Statutory Priorities
While it is beyond the scope of this article to consider all specific
legislative priorities, the following should serve to illustrate the
general trend of roadway pre-emption. Recognizing the importance
of the highway to California's future, the legislature has acted to
clarify a number of situations in which the roadway, by law, takes
express priority over other public uses.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1248a provides that in any pro-
ceeding under the general eminent domain law where any railroad,
street or interurban railway tracks are within land sought for "road,
highway, boulevard, street or alley purposes," the condemning agency
may obtain a judgment of condemnation not only securing the lands,
but also ordering the relocation or removal of the tracks thereon.
This statute is interesting for what it leaves unsaid. The crossing of
tracks by streets is a natural intersection of two modes of transporta-
tion and both can exist without destroying the other. Even without
such statutory authorization as section 1248a, therefore, the law con-
fers by necessary implication the right of a street to cross a track. 19
16 1 P. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAwN § 2.2[3], at 225 (rev. 3d
ed. 1964) (emphasis added).
17 Cemetery Co. v. Warren School, 236 Ind. 171, 187, 139 N.E.2d 538, 545
(1957).
18 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 724, 123 P.2d 505, 512 (1942).
19 Market St. Ry. v. Central Ry., 51 Cal. 583, 586 (1877); cf. Long Beach v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 44 Cal. 2d 599, 602-03, 283 P.2d 1036, 1037-38 (1955). See also
1 P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DomiAwi § 2.2[1], at 213 (rev. 3d ed. 1964).
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However, a longitudinal take of the track would absolutely preclude
any further use by the railroad, so that in the absence of section 1248a
there could be no such longitudinal take unless it were "more neces-
sary" under section 1241(3). Section 1248a is important, therefore, be-
cause it implies that roads of asphalt and concrete have indisputable
priority over those of rail.
It should be noted that certain powers also reside in the California
Public Utilities Commission in the case of railroad grade crossings.
No crossing of a railroad by a public road, highway or street can be
made without prior permission of the Commission in order that it may
review and prescribe the location, maintenance and use of warning
devices for such crossing.20 Further, certain monies must be budgeted
in a state highway fund for the purpose of assisting cities, counties
and cities, and counties to pay their proportionate share of construct-
ing grade crossing protection works.21
The Streets and Highways Code declares that it is State policy to
acquire and own all toll bridges upon or along any part of its high-
ways.22 In accordance with that statement of policy, the State's acqui-
sition of "any transportation facilities ... real property, personal
property, franchises, rights, easements, or other property or privi-
leges appurtenant thereto appropriated or dedicated to a public use
... by any person, public, private or municipal corporation, county,
city, district, or any political subdivision of the State"23 for the same
or a different use is deemed a more necessary use and purpose than
the use to which the property had already been appropriated or
dedicated. There is an exception to this priority provision for rights-
of-way necessary for the operation of a common carrier by railroad.
Yet this railroad use is narrowly defined to be one other than an
interurban operation to and from an area within 50 miles from either
end of any toll bridge or other toll highway crossing. Further,
even a prior railroad use falling within this exception may be taken
upon pleading and proving that the public interest and necessity re-
quire the acquisition.24
Parking facilities are an obvious auxiliary to the roadway, and
the legislature has dispensed a broad power to parking authorities to
acquire any property, "except that property of a state public body
shall not be acquired without its consent."25
Recently, the State invoked its strong Property Acquisition Law26
20 CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 1201.
21 Id. § 1231.
22 CAL. STREETs & H'WAYS CODE § 30,001.
23 Id. § 30,402.
24 Id.
25 Id. § 32,802(b).
20 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 15,850.
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to take lands owned by the City of Los Angeles and used for park
purposes.27 The proposed use of the Public Works Board was to be for
a parking lot for the California Museum of Science and Industry.
The law relied upon included provisions enacted in 194428 to secure a
post-war construction program. Section 15,856 of the Government
Code establishes a priority of public use: "In any condemnation pro-
ceeding brought under this law, the use for which the property is
condemned shall be deemed a public use more necessary than any
other public use to which the property is devoted at the time the
action was commenced." In this case the automobile seems to have
been the accidental beneficiary of a law that was established for other
purposes.
Another certain priority was established in 193729 with the enact-
ment of Streets and Highways Code section 103.5, declaring that lands
necessary for state highway purposes may be placed over any prop-
erty dedicated to park purposes, regardless of the manner by which
such property may have been dedicated. Two cases, People v. City of
Los Angeles30 and Barry v. Department of Public Works,3 1 ruled that
this statute of specific authorization controls the general power ex-
pressed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1240 (3). But the statement
in City of Los Angeles that "it cannot be said as a matter of law that a
state freeway is not a 'more necessary public use' than a city park
.".3 has recently been emasculated by the legislature.
In the 1968 session, Senator Milton Marks introduced a bill,33
passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor, which added
new language to the Code of Civil Procedure.3 4 This new enactment
establishes a rebuttable presumption that the "best and most neces-
sary public use"3 5 of property appropriated to a state, regional, county
or city park is such use as a park. Further, whenever a state highway
seeks to intrude, the public agency owning the park may bring an
action for declaratory relief within 120 days of the notification by the
State Highway Commission that the park is sought for highway use.3 6
27 State v. Los Angeles, 256 A.C.A. 1041, 64 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967).
28 Act of June 16, 1944, ch. 16, § 5, 1944 Cal. Stats. 151.
29 Act of July 1, 1937, ch. 931, § 2, 1937 Cal. Stats. 2558.
30 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960).
3' 199 Cal. App. 2d 359, 18 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1962).
82 People v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 565, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531,
535 (1960).
33 S.B. 1109 (1968).
34 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241.7, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 1328,
§ 1, at 2443. The bill also added CAL. STREETs & H'wAYs CODE § 210.1, added
by Cal. Stats. 1968, ch. 1328, § 2, at 2443. These sections will be discussed in
text accompanying notes 92-94 infra.
35 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241.7(a) (emphasis added).
36 Id. § 1241.7(b).
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At such a hearing, the resolution of need by the Commission is not
conclusive. But unless the action is brought within 120 days, the
benefits of the statute are lost. Thus, the road may still invade the
park, but its entry will be made more difficult.
One specific area that roadways, by law, cannot enter is land
dedicated to cemetery purposesY7 When the Division of Highways
nonetheless sought to lay out a freeway through Eden Memorial Park
Cemetery of Los Angeles, claiming that the prohibiting statute stood
in derogation of sovereignty and had to be construed, therefore,
strictly in favor of the State, the Second District Court of Appeal
found that the Legislature had long protected burial grounds from
molestation and desecration through invasion of public thorough-
fares.38 Such a policy would be defeated if the State could except
itself from the general prohibition.
Curiously, in another case, a school district was allowed to
amend its complaint upon the sustaining of a demurrer, in order to
show that, although the land sought was dedicated for cemetery pur-
poses, it had not been used for that purpose.39 Since there is no
specific prohibition against school uses, that case could only interpret
the general law of Code of Civil Procedure section 1240 (3) and Health
and Safety Code section 8552 pertaining to cemeteries. Section 8552
provides that upon the filing of the map for dedication to cemetery
purposes "the dedication is complete for all purposes and thereafter
the property shall be held, occupied and used exclusively for a cem-
etery and for cemetery purposes." If the land could be shown not to
have been used for any purpose, however, presumably the school
district could assert that its location of educational facilities in the
unused cemetery grounds would serve a higher public purpose.
A further reserve from highway invasion is the land of State
hospitals.40 Welfare & Institutions Code section 4104, however, does
provide an exception allowing the Legislature by special enactment
to consent to the opening of streets or roads through State hospital
boundaries. In addition, there are specific code sections authorizing
the Director of General Services, with the consent of the Department
of Mental Hygiene, to grant rights-of-way across specifically described
areas of the Sonoma State Hospital,41 Patton State Hospital,42 Agnew
37 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8560.
38 Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 421, 11
Cal. Rptr. 189 (1961).
39 Woodland School Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n, 174 Cal. App. 2d
243, 344 P.2d 326 (1959).
40 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 4104.
41 Id. § 4105.
42 Id. § 4106.
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State Hospital,43 Stockton State Hospital44 and the Modesto State
Hospital.45
In spite of these attempts to establish specific priority of public
uses in certain areas, litigation has occurred. But the clearest invita-
tion to legal dispute lies in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1240(3)
and 1241(3), which provide for the acquisition of land already devoted
to a public use whenever a proposed public use is a "more necessary"
one. If a condemnor does not enjoy the advantage of an express
statutory priority, therefore, it may well attempt to acquire publicly
used land under the "more necessary" provisions of sections 1240 (3)
and 1241 (3). If it does, the court, unaided by specific legislative
priorities, must determine which of the two competing public uses
will serve the greatest public good. While the issue of which of the
competing uses is of greater interest to the public can be determined
only on a case-by-case basis, the general criteria and procedural me-
chanics for reaching that determination can be abstractly formulated.
Before attempting such a formulation, however, the language and the
history of sections 1240 (3) and 1241 (3) should be examined.
B. Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240 and 1241-
General Background and Interpretation
When the Sacramento lawmakers first put together California's
procedural code in 1872, they provided that "private property" that
may be taken under the power of eminent domain includes "property
appropriated to a public use. '46  Section 1240(3) 47 is the enabling
43 Id. § 4107.
44 Id. § 4108.
45 Id. § 4108.1.
46 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1240 (3).
47 The text of sub-section three thereof states that "private property" in-
cludes: "Property appropriated to public use; but such property shall not be
taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which it has already
been appropriated; provided, that where any such property has been so
appropriated by any individual, firm or private corporation, the use thereof
for a State highway or a public street or highway of the state, or a county, city
and county, incorporated city or town, joint highway district, or irrigation or
municipal water district, for the same public purpose to which it has been so
appropriated, or for any other public purpose shall be deemed more neces-
sary uses than the public use to which such property has already been appro-
priated; and provided further, that where property already appropriated to a
public use or purpose, by any person, firm or private corporation, is sought to
be taken by the state, a county, city and county, incorporated city or town,
joint highway district, irrigation or municipal water district, for another pub-
lic use or purpose, which is consistent with the continuance of the use of such
property or some portion thereof for such existing purpose, to the same extent
as such property is then used, or to a less or modified extent, then the right to
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statute" and 1241(3)4 9 is the implementation of what is granted, al-
use such property for such proposed public purpose, in common with such
other use or purpose, either as then existing, or to a less or modified extent,
may be taken by the state, such county, city and county, incorporated city or
town, joint highway district, or irrigation or municipal water district, and the
court may fix the terms and conditions upon which such property may be so
taken, and the manner and extent of the use thereof for each of such public
purposes, and may order the removal or relocation of any structures, or im-
provements therein or thereon, so far as may be required by such common use.
But property appropriated to the use of any county, city and county, incorpo-
rated city or town, or municipal water district, may not be taken by any other
county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or municipal water district,
while such property is so appropriated and used for the public purposes for
which it has been so appropriated."
48 CONDEMNATION PRACTICE § 8.17, at 144 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1960),
states that "[a]lthough C.C.P. § 1240 appears to be enabling and § 1241 pro-
cedural, a recent case assumes that the sections are interchangeable." The
case mentioned is Marin County v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 633, 349 P.2d 526,
2 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1960).
49 The text of sub-section three thereof is as follows: "If already appro-
priated to some public use, that the public use of which it is to be applied is a
more necessary public use; provided, that where such property has been so
appropriated by any individual, firm or private corporation the use thereof
for a public street or highway of the State, a county, city and county, or any
incorporated city or town, or joint highway district, or the use thereof by the
State, a county, city and county, or any incorporated city or town, or joint
highway district, or a municipal water district or an irrigation district, a
transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, or a water
district for the same purposes to which it has been appropriated or for any
public purpose, shall be deemed a more necessary use than the public use to
which such property has been already appropriated; and provided, further,
that property of any character, whether already appropriated to public use or
not, including all rights of any nature in water, owned by any person, firm or
private corporation may be taken by a county, city and county, or any in-
corporated city or town or by a municipal water district, or an irrigation
district, a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, or a
water district, for the purpose of supplying water, or electricity for power,
lighting or heating purposes to such county, city and county, or incorporated
city or town, or municipal water district, or an irrigation district, a transit
district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, or a water district,
or the inhabitants thereof, or for the purpose of supplying any other public
utility, or for any other public use. And such taking may be made, either to
furnish a separate and distinct supply of such water, and such electricity for
power, lighting or heating purposes, or to provide for any such separate and
distinct other public utility or other public use; to furnish such a supply or
provide for any such other public utility or other public use in conjunction
with any other supply or with any other public utility or other public use
that may have been theretofore provided for or that may thereafter be pro-
vided for in so supplying or providing for such county, city and county, or
incorporated city or town or municipal water district or an irrigation district,
a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, or a water
district, or the inhabitants thereof; or in conjunction with any other supply
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though much of the latter section is redundant. In 1911, a proviso
was added to these laws, which inter alia declared that the taking of
property already appropriated for a public purpose by any "individual,
firm or private corporation" for the construction of a public street or
highway of the State, county, municipality or joint highway district
"shall be deemed a more necessary use than the public use to which
the property has already been appropriated." 50
As is frequently the case, however, the law disburses power only
to qualify it by a subsequent limitation. The last sentences of sub-
section 3 of sections 1240 and 1241 perform this task. Property
already appropriated to the use of a county, city or one of the follow-
ing types of districts-municipal water, irrigation, transit, rapid tran-
sit, public utility or water-may not be taken for a new public use by
another county, city or one of the designated districts "while such
property is so appropriated."
Upon first look, the exemption seems to have been intended to
prevent one political subdivision or district from taking over the like
functions of a similar entity or district. But the language is broader
than that necessary merely to effect this result. For example, in 1960
the Marin Municipal Water District was prohibited from condemning
two county roads that would have been inundated by the proposed
public project of a dam and reservoir to be constructed under the
supervision of the District. The decision held that the county roads
were within the exemption provisions of sections 1240 (3) and 1241 (3) .51
The classification of exempted entities is difficult to understand.
One of the largest groups of condemning agencies that has a vital pub-
or with any other public utility or other public use that may have been
theretofore determined upon or that may thereafter be determined upon in
accordance with law by the people of any such county, city and county, incor-
porated city or town or municipal water district or an irrigation district, a
transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, or a water
district. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as in any way limiting
such rights as may be given by any other law of this State to counties, cities
and counties, incorporated cities or towns or municipal water districts or
irrigation districts, transit districts, rapid transit districts, public utility dis-
tricts, or water districts.
"But private property appropriated to the use of any county, city and
county, incorporated city or town, or municipal water district, or irrigation
district, or transit district, or rapid transit district, or public utility district,
or water district, may not be taken by any other county, city and county,
incorporated city or town, or municipal district, or irrigation district, or trans-
it district, or rapid transit district, or public utility district, or water district,
while such property is so appropriated and used for the public purposes for
which it has been so appropriated."
50 Act of April 5, 1911, ch. 358, § 1, 1911 Cal. Stats. 620.
51 Manin County v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 633, 349 P.2d 526, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 758 (1960).
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lic purpose-school districts-is omitted. Apparently the desired goal
was only to keep sacrosanct key utility services of urban life. Yet
the exemption does not smoothly coincide with other language of the
subsection that indicates that the State, counties, cities, joint highway
districts, water districts, irrigation districts, transit districts and pub-
lic utility districts may take the lands of an individual, firm or private
corporation appropriated to a public purpose for either the same pur-
pose or another public purpose.
In interpreting the proviso and the exemption, the cases have
made careful distinctions. First, a private power company, which had
devoted its properties to the public use of other municipalities and
water districts, was ruled within the exemption when threatened with
a takeover by the City of Los Angeles. 52 Second, the exemption was
not extended to a private water company that supplied services to
persons within the boundaries of the condemning city.53 But a gov-
ernmental agency-an irrigation district-that supplied water to the
inhabitants of the condemning city, was within the exemption. 4
In seeking direction from these two statutes, it is also important
to determine what is mean by "appropriation" to a public use.
"Appropriation" obviously is not synonymous with ownership by a
public entity. Both sections 1240 and 1241 expressly declare that
property may be appropriated to a public use, even though it is
owned by a private individual or corporation. Moreover, subsection
2 of section 1240 declares that lands of the State "not appropriated to
some public use" are susceptible to condemnation by a lesser public
agency, and then describes those lands to include "tide and submerged
lands." Although the negative description is not complete, the legis-
lature has been more concrete than the judiciary, which declared that
the word is synonymous with "devoted to."55
Secondly, "appropriation to" or "devotion to" a public use does
not necessarily mean that the property must actually be in use for a
public purpose. Property acquired by a condemnor for public use and
held in reasonable anticipation of future needs with a bona fide inten-
tion of using it for such public purpose within a reasonable time is
"appropriated to" a public use.56
It is suggested that simply by giving the word its usual meaning,
52 Mono Power Co. v. Los Angeles, 284 F. 784 (9th Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 262 U.S. 751 (1923).
53 North Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 482, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 538 (1961).
54 Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist., 63 Cal. 2d 291, 405 P.2d 377, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 465 (1965).
55 Deseret Water, Oil & Irr. Co. v. State, 167 Cal. 147, 138 P. 981 (1914).
5O See East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Lodi, 120 Cal. App. 740, 755, 8 P.2d
532, 538 (1932).
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i.e., "to designate the use of a thing," it follows that once an agency
has exercised control over a parcel of property, it has been appropri-
ated. Unappropriated land would include "excess lands"57 acquired
to avoid severance damage, and property that has escheated to the
State.
Nevertheless, Code of Civil Procedure section 1241(3) "has no
application to a case where the same land can be subject to a second
servitude without disturbing the first."'58 In such a case, there is no
"taking" of the prior public use. For example, in City of Pasadena v.
Stimson,59 the California Supreme Court held that section 1241(3) was
not applicable where the acquisition was for a sewer that would not
seriously interfere with the use of the highway along which it was
installed.
With the above general rules in mind, it is now possible to con-
sider the narrower question of "more necessary public use," which is
the essence of sections 1240 and 1241. Assuming that a condemnor is
without the benefit of a legislative priority, what procedure should
the trial court follow to determine whether the proposed use is of
greater public merit than the existing one?
C. Judicial Resolution of the "More Necessary Public Use"
In order to determine the framework within which a trial court
must decide the "more necessary public use" issue of sections 1240(3)
and 1241(3), one must start with the syntax of that phrase. Unfor-
tunately, much of the confusion surrounding this issue arises from
the juxtaposition of the words "more necessary" rather than the words
offered in Nichols' treatise on eminent domain-a "greater public in-
terest."60
Nonjusticiability of Necessity
It is essential to the right of eminent domain that the property
sought to be condemned will be applied to a public use and that it is
needed for that use. But while the issue of public use is justiciable,
the issue of necessity is not. Unfortunately, the distinction between
necessity and public use is not an easy one to draw and the courts have
frequently confused the two concepts. 61 Whereas "[n]ecessity is
57 See CAL. CoDE Civ. PROC. § 1266; CAL. STRETs & H'WAYS CODE §§ 104.1,
943.1 (state and county highways).
58 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 256, 27 P. 604, 609 (1891). See also
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240(3) (second proviso).
59 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
60 1 P. NICHOLS, TnE LAw OF EMENT DOMAiN § 2.2[3], at 225 (rev. 3d
ed. 1964).
61 See King, Condemnation Quandary: Public Use and Necessity-The
Impact of Decisions in Recent Years, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 405 (1966).
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equated with a want, an exigency, or an expediency for the interest
and safety of the people,"0' 2 raising questions first of need and then of
location, public use "concerns the whole community or promotes the
general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of govern-
ment."63 These legitimate governmental objects are listed in Code
of Civil Procedure section 1238 and include such obvious functions as
road building, erection of school facilities, flood control projects and
so forth. As the California appellate court has said, "[t] he character
of the use, and not its extent, determine the question of public use."64
The question immediately arises, however, whether the legis-
lature, by having the word "necessary" stand in modification of
"public use" in the two sections, intended to give the judiciary the
right to review necessity as a tool for weighing the comparative merits
of two public uses. Actually, there are three necessity questions: 65
(1) whether the court can inquire into the need for the particular proj-
ect; (2) whether the court can weigh the plan presented with alter-
nate plans and locations in terms of cost and practicability; and (3)
whether the court can determine if the property in question is an
integral part of the project.
It appears that the answer to each question must be negative.
The legislative concern was with greater public use, not with neces-
sity. The court must assume, therefore, that the land under condem-
nation is necessary to both of the contesting parties.
Confirmation of this conclusion is evident in section 1241(2): A
resolution or ordinance of the governing board of a city, county, school
district or other designated public service district, "when adopted by a
vote of two-thirds of all its members," shall be conclusive evidence:
(a) of the public necessity of such proposed public utility or public
improvement; (b) that such property is necessary therefor, and (c)
that such proposed public utility or public improvement is planned or
located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest
public good, and least private injury.
There follows a proviso that the resolution or ordinance is not con-
clusive as against property located beyond the territorial limits of the
condemning agency.
In the case of People v. Chevalier,66 both the State and the City of
Los Angeles had condemned different portions of the same privately
owned parcel of land for a project of mutual interest regarding high-
62 Id. at 406.
63 Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 289 P.2d 1, 6 (1955).
64 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lagiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d
23, 38, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554, 564 (1963) (emphasis added).
65 See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2), where the following language is
found: "That the taking is necessary to such [public] use."
66 52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).
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way and street coordination. The City passed a resolution of necessity
pursuant to section 1241(2) and the California Highway Commission
did the same under a similar statute, Streets and Highways Code sec-
tion 103. The cases were consolidated for trial and both public agen-
cies met allegations of fraud, bad faith and abuse of discretion with
respect to their resolutions. More specifically, the landowner raised
the spectre of a conspiracy between the City and the State. The
charge was that the condemnation by the City served no legitimate
city purpose, but was simply in aid of the State project and saved the
latter the cost of building a service road to the landowner's property.
The superior court, however, struck these special defenses of the con-
demnee and an appeal was taken.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed that the only limita-
tions placed upon the right of eminent domain are those of the
Constitution that the taking be for a "public use" and that "just com-
pensation" be paid for the taking.67 While these questions are jus-
ticiable, that of necessity is not.
We therefore hold, despite the implications to the contrary in some of
the cases, that the conclusive effect accorded by the Legislature to the
condemning body's findings of necessity cannot be affected by allega-
tions that such findings were made as the result of fraud, bad faith,
or abuse of discretion. In other words, the questions of the necessity
for making a given public improvement, the necessity for adopting a
particular plan therefor, or the necessity for taking particular prop-
erty, rather than other property, for the purpose of accomplishing
such public improvement, cannot be made justiciable issues even
though fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion may be alleged in
connection with the condemning body's determination of such neces-
sity. To hold otherwise would not only thwart the legislative pur-
pose in making such determinations conclusive but would open the
door to endless litigation, and perhaps conflicting determinations on
the question of "necessity" in separate condemnation actions brought
to obtain the parcels sought to carry out a single public improve-
ment.
68
The constitutionality of section 1241(2) had previously been up-
held by the United States Supreme Court in Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles.69 It was alleged there that the failure to provide for a hear-
ing before the resolution of necessity was adopted violated the due
process clause. Justice Sanford answered with language from an-
other case70 that was decided the same day: "[T]he necessity and
expediency of taking property for public use is a legislative and not a
judicial question [and] is not open to discussion .... The question
is purely political, does not require a hearing, and is not subject to
judicial inquiry."71 Or, as the lower court in that decision had stated:
67 Id. at 304, 340 P.2d at 601.
68 Id. at 307, 340 P.2d at 603 (emphasis added).
69 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
70 Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923).
71 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923).
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Where the owner of property that is being condemned is accorded his
constitutional right to just compensation, the condemning body's
"motives or reasons that it is necessary to take the land are no concern
of his.17 2
Finally, there are other judicial clues pointing to the conclusion
that the issue of "more necessary public use" does not draw into focus
the trilogy of necessity questions. For example, in Barry v. Depart-
ment of Public Works, the Division of Highways sought to traverse, as
a part of U.S. 99E, the 2,400 acre Bidwell Park in Butte County. An
action to enjoin the taking was instituted.73 The supreme court had
already decreed in People v. City of Los Angeles74 that the Highway
Commission's resolution of necessity under Streets and Highways
Code section 103.5 was final and presented no issue for the court. The
petitioner in Barry, however, urged that the City of Los Angeles case
be overruled, "contending that said section 103.5 does not authorize a
determination of greater necessity by the commission which the courts
cannot review."75
The trial court granted summary judgment, based upon section
103.5, which states:
The real property which the department may acquire by eminent do-
main, or otherwise, includes any property dedicated to park purposes,
however it may have been dedicated, when the commission has deter-
mined by such resolution that such property is necessary for State
highway purposes.
Justice Pierce, speaking for the appellate court, affirmed the trial
court's judgment by announcing that the statutory language "leaves
no room to insert, judicially, any further authorization for court re-
view."76  Although this language was sufficiently strong to dispose
of the case entirely, Justice Pierce went on to answer what he termed
"the theory of appellants '77 concerning the justiciability of necessity.
That theory was that although under the rule of the Chevalier deci-
sion a court had to give "conclusive effect to the resolution of neces-
sity where condemnation of private property is involved, the rule
cannot be applied where the property to be condemned is already
devoted to a public use."7 8 The court, citing from Nichols' treatise on
eminent domain, concluded that "[w]hen the legislature has author-
72 Los Angeles County v. Rindge Co., 53 Cal. App. 166, 174, 200 P. 27, 31
(1921).
73 Barry v. Department of Pub. Works, 199 Cal. App. 2d 359, 18 Cal. Rptr.
637 (1962).
74 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960).
75 Barry v. Department of Pub. Works, 199 Cal. App. 2d 359, 360, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 637, 638 (1962).
76 Id. at 362, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
77 Id. at 361, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
78 Id.
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ized the exercise of eminent domain in a particular case, it has neces-
sarily adjudicated that the land to be taken is needed for the public
use, and no other or further adjudication is necessary . . . . 7 Al-
though acknowledging that both this latter statement and the Cheva-
lier decision refer to condemnation of private property, the court had
no difficulty in finding that the issue of necessity is "no less a matter
of legislative prerogative . .. where the property is already applied
to another public purpose."80
What the court indicates by such language is that irrespective of
section 103.5's specific legislative priority, a general resolution of
necessity must be accepted by the bench in its determination of which
conflicting public use serves the greater public purpose. There are
three decisions, prior to Barry, that offer support for such a conclu-
sion.
First, the 1891 case of Pasadena v. Stimson8 ' equated "more neces-
sary" to "superior." The court, finding that the use of a proposed
sewer would not interfere with the existing highway, dismissed Code
of Civil Procedure section 1241 (3) as not being applicable. "[I] t was
not necessary to show that the new use was superior to the one to
which the property was already appropriated. '82
The next case in point is Woodland School District v. Woodland
Cemetery Association,83 in which the court distinguished between
"necessity" and "more necessary public use." In ascertaining the
propriety of a school's invasion of cemetery lands, the court narrowly
defined the issue as "whether the taking of the lands in question for
necessary school purposes would be a more necessary public use than
that for which it has already been appropriated, that is, cemetery
purposes."84 The court in Woodland thus appears to have accepted
both the school and its proposed location as being necessary. An
underlying assumption was that both the cemetery and the school
had a legitimate need for the particular land.
Finally, in People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Los
Angeles, 5 the Second District Court of Appeal gave strong evidence
that the presumption of necessity applies to the taking of both pri-
vate property and property already devoted to a public use. In that
case the court ignored the specific priority established by Streets and
79 Id. at 362, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 640; see 1 P. NIcHoLs, TmE LAw OF EINENT
"DovAm § 4.11, at 376 (rev. 3d ed. 1964).
80 Barry v. Department of Pub. Works, 199 Cal. App. 2d 359, 362, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 639, 640 (1962) (emphasis added).
81 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
82 Id. at 256, 27 P. at 609.
88 174 Cal. App. 2d 243, 344 P.2d 326 (1959).
84 Id. at 246, 344 P.2d at 327 (emphasis added).
85 179 Cal. App. 2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960).
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Highways Code section 103.5 and upheld the State's acquisition of a
city park as a "more necessary public use" under the more general
law of Code of Civil Procedure sections 1240 (3) and 1241(3) .86 Recog-
nizing the "essential" public importance of streets, highways and free-
ways, the court concluded that "it cannot be said as a matter of law
that a state freeway is not a 'more necessary public use' than a city
park-particularly when, as here, the freeway also constitutes a fed-
eral defense highway (Ex. 13) of concern to city, county, state and
nation, primary to a park dedicated and maintained for the use of city
residents."8 7
As to Los Angeles' contention that the State's acquisition was not
necessary, the court turned to the language of Chevalier to establish
the conclusiveness of the State's resolution of necessity. The court
added that Chevalier "is also controlling on the inadmissibility of
evidence of alternate routes and we find on the issue of 'necessity' no
error in excluding the same or evidence of cost of acquisition of other
land to substitute for the park land taken."88 The court was referring
to the fact that the trial court received evidence regarding the char-
acter of the use, as shown by reference to Exhibit 13 of the record,
but would not consider alternate routes. This is perhaps the strongest
indicia that the judiciary will embrace the Chevalier rule of neces-
sity, which was formulated to sustain the taking of private property,
as the correct statement of law for the taking of lands already devoted
to a public use.
It can be seen, therefore, that the above cases reiterated the dis-
tinction between necessity and public use, with the Woodland decision
placing the issue of "more necessary public use" in a third category,
separate even from general necessity. These decisions were the bed-
rock upon which the court in Barry established its conclusion that,
even without the benefit of a specific legislative priority, a condem-
nor's general resolution of necessity must be accepted by the trial
court in its balancing of conflicting public uses.
Since the court is precluded from reviewing necessity questions,
its decision of which public use is "more necessary" is made vastly
simpler. It need not analyze engineering and cost data upon which
the selection of the particular route under consideration is based.
Rather, it can take judicial notice of prior decisions exclaiming the
dependency of the State on a modern system of freeways and con-
nections thereto, and legislative priorities giving the roadway suprem-
acy over other uses. Under this system, the proponent of a road that
is designed to be a major carrier of traffic and commerce would enjoy
86 Id. at 564, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
s Id. at 565, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 535-36.
88 Id. at 568, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
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a justifiable advantage when condemning lands used for such purposes
as school playgrounds or public recreational facilities.
The above rule of procedure allows the trial court to measure
only the character of the conflicting uses-the public extent and im-
pact of each. Yet by asking how many vehicles a particular roadway
will carry, where it will carry them and what the importance to the
community of that course of traffic will be, the court is coming close
to a consideration of the first necessity question, i.e., the need for
the improvement. Furthermore, by ruling in favor of the invader,
the court effectively holds that the condemnee does not need all or
part of its particular lands, or that it can locate elsewhere. As a re-
sult, it cannot be stated absolutely that the framework outlined above
is complete or fully satisfactory. There is need of legislative clarifica-
tion of 1240(3) and 1241(3), the latter already being burdened with
provisos that present more confusion than direction.
Marks Bill
Perhaps an even better procedure for solving the dilemma of
"emore necessary public use" can be achieved through an extension of
the 1968 Marks Bill,89 which dealt exclusively with parks. That bill
enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 1241.790 which provides that
89 S.B. 1109 (1968).
90 The full text of that section is as follows: "(a) Except as provided in
subdivision (b), notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,
the fact that property is appropriated for public use as a state, regional,
county, or city park establishes a rebuttable presumption of its having been
appropriated for the best and most necessary public use. The presumption
established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
(b) When property appropriated for a public use as a state, regional,
county, or city park is sought to be acquired for state highway purposes, and
such park was dedicated to or established for park purposes prior to the ini-
tiation of highway route location studies, an action for declaratory relief may
be brought only by the public agency owning such park in the superior court
to determine the question of which public use is the best and most necessary
public use for such property. Such action for declaratory relief shall be filed
and served within 120 days after written notice to the public agency owning
such park by the California Highway Commission that a proposed route or
an adopted route includes park land owned by that agency. In such declara-
tory relief action, the resolution of the commission shall not be conclusive
evidence of the matters set forth in Section 103 of the Streets and Highways
Code. Such action for declaratory relief shall have preference over all other
civil actions in the matter of setting the same for hearing or trial to the end
that any such action shall be quickly heard and determined. If an action for
declaratory relief is not filed and served within such 120-day period, the
right to bring such action is waived and the provisions of subdivision (a)
shall not apply. When a declaratory relief action with respect to such prop-
erty being sought for highway purposes, may not be brought pursuant to
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land already appropriated to a state, regional, county or city park is
the most necessary use of the property. In order to overcome this
presumption the State Highway Commission must establish compel-
ling reasons for needing the project, the propriety of the location and
the need for the particular property in question. Further, because
the park can only challenge the condemnation by bringing an action
for declaratory relief within 120 days after written notice by the
Commission, the Commission is under pressure to inform the public
agency owning the park that a proposed or adopted route includes its
lands.
In addition, Streets and Highways Code section 210.191 requests
that the Department of Public Works and the Highway Commission
avoid using park lands. But in cases "where such lands are necessary
for state highway purposes ... the department shall coordinate and
confer with appropriate public agencies responsible for park develop-
ment during the route planning, design and construction phase of a
state highway project." Finally, the department must report to the
Commission alternate route studies, showing the feasibility of by-
passing the park.
These new sections are designed only to give preference to parks,
but the extension of the checks and balances there described is a
desired goal for all roadway challenges of other prior public uses.
Conclusion
The employment by sections 1240(3) and 1241(3) of the criterion
"more necessary public use" is an insufficient safeguard because there
is uncertainty regarding its interpretation and because the statutes
this subdivision, the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section shall not
apply."
91 The full text of that section is as follows: "(a) The department and
the commission, in the planning and design of highway projects, shall attempt
to avoid using lands for public parks, and where such lands are necessary for
state highway purposes shall attempt to minimize the intrusion or impact on
such parks by special design, construction and landscape treatment so that
the highway will be harmonious with the environment. The department shall
coordinate and confer with appropriate public agencies responsible for park
development during the route planning, design and construction phase of a
state highway project. The feasibility of bypassing a public park by an
alternative route shall be studied and included in the report of alternate
route studies to the commission.
(b) Public agencies having jurisdiction over parks shall, in their plan-
ning and location of parks, consider present and future needs for safe and
modern highway transportation, including highway access to such parks, and
shall coordinate their planning with public agencies having jurisdiction over
streets and highways so that conflicts are minimized and the public interest
is best served."
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fail to require prior conferences with the invaded public use and/or
studies of the design and cost feasibility of avoiding that use.
The problem is one of legislative policy. While the legislature
cannot possibly define an order of public use priorities that would
cover every situation, it should act to clarify the general provisions of
sections 1240 (3) and 1241 (3) to provide an orderly procedure for deter-
mining which of two conflicting public uses is "more necessary." The
present judicial interpretation of those sections, as illustrated by the
California roadway cases, is more by innuendo than by decree. The
resulting danger of confusion and misinterpretation can only be
alleviated by express statutory guidelines.
